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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The inflow of foreign capital is generally seen as an accelerating force to 
economic growth, due to provision of additional resources, and these funds are 
considered complementary to local savings.  It could also help to transfer technology 
and, therefore, increase productivity. Besides it enhances purchasing power of the 
recipients [Mullick (1988)] and as a result stimulates growth.  The purpose of foreign 
debt is to increase real transfer of resources from the developed countries to the 
developing countries, so that these countries could pick up momentum of economic 
growth and as a result improve their welfare.1 
The rapid increase in the external debt obligations of the developing countries, 
during the 1970s, had given rise to concerns about the dangers of increasing trend in 
interest and amortisation payments and, therefore, this situation posed a threat to 
debtor countries. The foreign debt of the developing countries has become a threat to 
their economic growth. The debt servicing of some of the LDC’s exceeded to their 
growth rates.2  Initially, most analysts believed that debt servicing problem would be 
temporary.  It was hoped that creditworthiness and more normal growth of most of 
the countries would be restored with the influx of foreign resources. However, the 
debt crises have demonstrated that this assessment was optimistic and seemed never 
to be realised.3 
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1Thirlwall (1999) pointed out that developed countries agreed, under UNO, to transfer 1 percent 
of their GDD as international aid to the developing world but it was never fulfilled. 
2The debt servicing is double than the economic growth of developing countries.  For details see 
Chaudhary and Anwar (2001). 
3For details of present nature of foreign debt and recycling of debt [see Thirlwall (1999)]. 
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The South Asian countries saw the inflow of foreign resources as to bridge the 
gap between their savings and investment.4 It was thought that these funds were 
needed to accelerate their desired growth.  It was also regarded as panacea for 
economic diseases, caused by the shortage of domestic resources. Thus, it was 
considered to supplement the desired investment.  But the dream of achieving high 
economic growth through foreign aid started gradually falling apart, when foreign 
debt turned out to be growing encumbrance on the foreign exchange earnings of 
these countries.  The year 1979-80 brought the world, particularly, the South Asian 
countries a set of economic problems—oil price shocks, reduction in primary 
products prices, budget deficit, balance of payments deficit, rising real interest rates 
and world wide recession, which made it difficult for them to service their debts 
[Smith and Cuddington (1989)]. 
Since the 1980s, the South Asian countries were trapped in a set of economic 
crisis.  According to World Debt Tables (1996), during the five years (1982–1986) 
the decline of economic growth rate of per capita income from 4 percent to 1 percent 
between 1982 and 1986 further added to their problems.  Besides the terms of trade 
for South Asia also deteriorated by a cumulative percentage of 15.4 points during the 
same period. 
Several researchers have analysed the debt burden issue from different 
perspectives.  Claessens and Diwan (1989) argue that the burden of foreign capital 
inflow can depress investment below its optimal level and thus leads to slow down 
economic growth of the recipient countries. This can occur through two channels; (i) 
inability to get desired foreign borrowing, a liquidity constraint, and debt overhang 
which is strong enough, therefore, (ii) expected future loss of output to foreign 
creditors.  From the debtor country’s perspective, the financing costs of voluntary 
debt reductions and transformations are likely to exceed the benefits. Thus, Pareto-
improving scheme are difficult to find in practice—unless the debtor uses funds 
donated for this purpose, or that it gains in exchange some concession from 
creditor’s group.  Therefore, conventional debt rescheduling cannot efficiently 
reconstruct under a situation of debt overhang. 
Increasing burden of foreign debt is becoming a threat to the developing 
economies of South Asia.  Appropriate economic policies may help to improve the 
situation. Debt-ridden countries have paid little attention to the increasing 
dependency upon foreign resources.  As a result, efforts are not made to generate or 
mobilise domestic resources; rather some of these economies have become 
consumption oriented.  This situation leads to a topology of debt crisis.  It defines a 
debt overhang, as a situation where outstanding debt is so large that investment will 
be inefficiently low without new foreign lending or debt and debt service reductions.  
A mild debt overhang can be resolved with new money approach alone [Sachs 
 
4The saving-investment gag was filled by borrowing from abroad, rather mobilising additional 
domestic resources. 
Debt Laffer Curve for South Asian Countries 
 
 
707
(1989)]; which is called a liquidity trap.  Otherwise, a debt overhang requires debt or 
debt service reductions unless the debtor uses a commitment mechanism.   When a 
debtor experiencing a debt overhang, that is more severe than a liquidity trap, is 
willing to commit to an adjustment programmes against the provision of liquidity 
alone, the situation is called a ‘weak’ debt overhang.  In such a situation, the 
commitment mechanism and new money creation resolve the crisis without the need 
to reduce debt and debt services.  But a ‘strong’ debt overhang cannot be resolved 
without debt and debt service reductions; the debtor will be unwilling to commit to a 
large investment programmes without debt reduction, even if large amounts of 
liquidity are not available.  Sustainability of debt may be evaluated by using Laffer 
Curve technique, developed by Sachs. 
The concept of a Laffer curve for the value of claims on a developing country 
can be used as an argument for debt forgivingness.  The logic implies that if a 
country is on the wrong (declining) side of the Debt Laffer curve, a reduction in 
nominal claims outstanding will lead to an increase in the value of outstanding 
claims and will thus benefit the both creditors and debtors. If the country is on the 
correct side of the Debt Laffer curve (right side), then, debt forgiveness will not 
increase the market value of debt, and creditors plus debtors as a whole, will lose. 
Thus, across-the-board debt forgiveness is only in the interest of the creditors and 
debtors when the debtor is on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve. 
Another aspect of Debt Laffer curve analysis is related to the price elasticity 
of the market value of the debt.  Greater the price elasticity of the debt, greater will 
be the benefits to the debtor from a debt reduction.  There is limited number of 
research that analysed the situation of debt overhang and the possibilities of debt 
reduction for indebted developing countries.  Most of the studies are cross sectional.  
Claessens (1990) estimated the market value of the debt for 29 highly indebted 
countries and identified only five countries that were on the wrong side of the Debt 
Laffer curve.5  Cohen (1989) estimated price elasticity of the debt for thirty 
developing countries that severe debt problem was only for four highly indebted 
countries. Thus the approaches help to identify the nature of debt problem. 
Following Claessens (1990) and Cohen (1989) in this study, we have carried 
out a time-series analysis for seven countries of South Asia.6 It will be interestingly 
important to find out whether these countries stand on the right or wrong side of 
Debt Laffer curve.  The estimates of the price elasticities of debt will reflect the 
relative effectiveness of debt written off for south Asian countries.  The policy 
description will be derived for meaningful evaluation of debt position in South Asia.  
So far hardly any study has analysed this aspect of foreign debt for the South Asian 
 
5Five countries are Bolivia, Sudan, Peru, Zambia and Nicaragua. See Claessens (1990).  There is 
no such study pertaining to S. Asian countries, as per knowledge. 
6These countries are Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan. These 
countries are also member of South Asian Associations for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
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countries. After this, the study is organised as under. Part II provides discussion on 
methodology and empirical estimation, by using Debt Laffer curve. The discussion 
of the results is provided in this Section III. Conclusion and policy implications are 
given in Section IV. 
 
II.  DEBT LAFFER CURVE:  METHODOLOGY 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship, as postulated by Sachs (1989) and Krugman 
(1988), between the face value of debt and the market value of expected repayments. 
On the horizontal axis, the nominal face value of the external claims is measured 
while on the vertical axis; the nominal face Value of foreign debt by creditors is 
measured. Creditors expect that the nominal claims will be paid in full at low levels 
of external debt.  The secondary market price will be one, and the value of the debt 
will lie along the 45-degree line.  At higher levels of debt, however, the possibilities 
of partial repayments grow as the country has fewer incentives to invest and market 
value of debt falls increasingly below the 45-degree line.  The secondary market 
price for debt, which is the slope of the line from the origin to point like A, will have 
a negative relationship with the amount of debt outstanding and it will fall 
increasingly below one as debt increases (Fig. 1).  At point B, the debt outstanding 
becomes so large and the nominal debt acts as such a large disincentive on the 
debtor’s effort to adjust, reform and invest, that the market value of debt starts to fall 
when the face value of debt increases further.7 
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7Claessens and Diwan (1989); Krugman (1988) and Froot (1989) derive Debt Laffer curve 
through formal models of a country’s investment and adjustment incentives. 
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Fig. 1.  Debt Laffer Curve. 
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The relationship between the nominal face value of the debt outstanding and 
the market value of the debt is related in the form of Debt Laffer curve.  The market 
value of the debt of a country is determined by the secondary market price of the 
debt as postulated by Claessens (1990) and Cohen (1989).  As market value of debt 
is dependent upon nominal amount of claims outstanding and other variables such as 
exports and with growth rate of exports which explains the country’s ability to repay 
the debt. (“creditworthiness” indicators).  To simplify assuming the real export 
growth rate as exogenous8 and debt servicing is assumed to be payable in equal 
annual instalments.  Further, assuming that the interest rate remains same during and 
after the grace period and this interest is payable after the end of the grace period. 
The secondary market price of debt involves three steps. Firstly, equal annual 
instalments payable on the external debt outstanding for South Asia, which are 
calculated by using the following formula.  
EAI = [(i) (M) (1+i/100)T (1+P/100)G ]/100(1+i/100)T … … (1) 
Where:  
 EAI = Equal annual instalments of debt servicing on a given amount of 
external debt outstanding.  
 i = Average rate of interest on foreign loans.  
 M = The amount of the external debt outstanding.   
 T = The repayment period.  
 P = The rate of interest in the grace period.  
 G = The grace period. 
After estimating the equal annual instalments present value of external debt 
outstanding is estimated by using equal annual instalments.  
PV = {(EAI) [1–1/(1+D/100)]}/{D/100[1+D/100]G}       … … (2) 
Where: 
 PV = present value of external debt outstanding.9   D = discount rate. 
Equation (2) can also be expressed as a price equation of external debt outstanding 
by dividing both sides by the amount of nominal claims outstanding.  Since the 
market value of debt is defined in terms of the secondary market prices.  Therefore, 
prices of debt can be determined by the following equation. 
SMP = D0 + D1 EXTD + D2 GREXP … … … … (3) 
Where: 
 
8The growth of real exports is likely to be dependent on the level of the external debt outstanding.  
[See Claessens  (1990).] 
9Present value of debt is the market value of the debt which depends on the secondary market 
prices of the debt. 
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 SMP = Secondary market price of the external debt outstanding. 
 EXTD = Ratio of the external debt outstanding to exports. 
 GREXP = Growth rate of exports.      
To see whether a country is on the right side of the Debt Laffer Curve or not, 
the maximised value of external debt is estimated. The maximised value of external 
debt can be estimated by multiplying the nominal external debt outstanding with its 
secondary market price for each country, as follows: 
MVD = (SMP) (M) … … … … … … (4) 
The second approach pertains to price elasticity is estimated for which the 
following procedure is followed.  Estimate the following equation. 
LSMP = E0 + E1 LEXTD + E2GREXP … … … (5) 
Where: 
 LSMP = Log of secondary market price of the external debt outstanding. 
 LEXTD = Log of external debt outstanding to exports ratio. 
 GREXP = Growth rate of exports. 
The impact of debt write off on the market value of the debt will depend on 
the marginal price of the debt.  Thus, marginal price of the debt can be estimated by 
the following formula.  
DMV = (SMP) (1–C) (DM) … … … … … (6) 
Where: 
 C = Price elasticity of the debt.  
 DMV = Change in the market value of debt.            
 DM = The change in total external debt outstanding. 
Now a country will stand to gain from a debt write off if and only if the 
following condition is fulfilled [Cohen (1988)]. 
C  >  (1–tx) (S.E) … … … … … … (7) 
Where:  
 tx =  t-statistic corresponding to the x-degree of confidence. 
 S.E = Standard error of the elasticity in Equation (5).  
The price elasticity of external debt outstanding measures the responsiveness 
of demand of foreign debt to changes in its own price.  If the price elasticity of 
external debt of a country is greater than the product of standard error and t-statistics 
corresponding to the x-degree of freedom, then a country gets benefit from debt 
reduction. 
Debt Laffer Curve for South Asian Countries 
 
 
711
Table 1, presents the estimates of the market value and the secondary market 
price of external debt outstanding of seven countries of South Asia.  As already 
mentioned in the methodology that market value of external debt is the present value 
of debt obtained from multiplying the nominal debt outstanding with its secondary 
market price for each year10 [Claessens (1990) and Sachs and Hizinga (1987)].  
The results of OLS estimate are obtained by applying a time series analysis 
for South Asian countries in this paper, which support the theoretical intuitions 
developed at the background of this model.  Claessens (1990) and Sachs and 
Huizinga (1987) estimate the Debt Laffer curve with OLS technique, while Cohen 
(1988) attempts to find out the Debt Laffer curve problem with price elasticity 
approach, while we estimate the Debt Laffer curve problem for South Asian 
countries with applying both approaches.  The sample size is taken from 1970-71 to 
1994-95 and data for all the countries are in real terms (1990-91 prices).  First of all, 
equal annual instalment are calculated for all the seven countries of South Asia, then 
through equal annual instalments we estimate the present value of debt outstanding 
by using Equation (2). 
The results of the price equation indicated that the secondary market price of 
debt for Pakistan has negative association with the nominal debt outstanding (debt to 
export ratio).  Then, this price equation is used to calculate the market value of 
external debt outstanding of Pakistan and other South Asian countries.  The equation 
for the market value of external debt outstanding can now be used to derive the face 
value of debt (debt to export ratio) for which the market value of debt reaches its 
maximum, the top of the Debt Laffer curve.   
As indicated in Table 1, there is a negative relationship of debt to export 
ratio with secondary market price of debt outstanding for Pakistan and India, and 
have an insignificant effect on secondary market price of debt outstanding.  
Pakistan and India are agricultural based countries and its products contribute a 
small amount to GNP and on the other hand, they also face balance of payment 
problem. In 1994-95, exports as a percentage of GNP was 15.9 percent for 
Pakistan and imports as a percentage of GNP was 24.5 percent, these figures for 
India was 11.6 percent and 15.7 percent, respectively.  The above figures 
indicate trade gaps for Pakistan and India respectively.  Therefore, any increase 
in exports insignificantly decreases the market value of external debt 
outstanding, whereas Bangladesh has also negative relationship but it has a 
significant effect.  The results show the same trend for Sri Lanka.  Debt-to-
export ratio of Nepal is also negative and shows insignificant effect on secondary 
market price of debt outstanding. An increase in exports insignificantly 
decreases the market value of debt.   
 
10The maximum value of debt can be estimated through the maximisation of Eq. MVD = (SMP) 
(EXTD). 
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Table 1 
Foreign Debt and Credit-worthiness 
(Estimates of the Price Equation of External Debt Outstanding) 
 Countries 
Dependent PAK IND BANG S.LAN NEPAL MALDI BHUT 
Const. 0.69 0.92 0.34 2.36 0.082 0.04 0.087 
 (1.30) (2.81)** (5.70)** (3.47)** (2.83)** (0.05) (0.61) 
Ext –0.02 –0.07 –0.04 –0.61 –0.0095 0.27 0.03 
 (–0.19) (–0.73) (–4.59)** (–2.21)* (–1.36) (0.75) (0.20) 
Grexp 0.0018 –0.012 –0.009 –0.024 –0.0002 0.02 –0.002 
 (0.35) (–1.03) (–0.02) (–2.55)* (–0.22) (0.82) (–0.29) 
R2 0.94 0.81 0.51 0.30 0.80 0.67 0.13 
D.W 1.71 1.76 1.47 2.01 1.53 2.25 2.08 
Figures in the parentheses refer to t-statistic. 
*Significant at 5 percent. **Significant at 10 percent. Where PAK stands for Pakistan, IND for India, 
BANG for Bangladesh, S.LAN for Sri Lanka, MALDI for Maldives and BHUT for Bhutan. 
 
Maldives and Bhutan are positive, but with insignificant relationship of debt-
to-export ratio and with secondary market price of debt outstanding. Growth rate of 
exports is positive but it has insignificant effect on secondary market price of debt 
outstanding for Pakistan and Maldives.  This means that one percent increase in 
growth rate of exports increases the SMP value by 0.002 in case of Pakistan and 0.02 
in case of Maldives.  Other five countries, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Bhutan are negative and insignificant relationship of growth rate of exports with 
secondary market price of debt outstanding.  This means that one percent increase in 
growth rate of exports decreases the SMP value by 0.012 for India, 0.009, in the case 
of Bangladesh, 0.024, in the case of Sri Lanka, 0.0002,  in case of Nepal and in the 
case of Bhutan it is 0.002. 
Except for Maldives and Bhutan the secondary market price of debt for 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal has a negative association with 
the nominal debt outstanding  (debt to export ratio) but Maldives and Bhutan have a 
positive relationship of face value of debt with secondary market price of debt. 
Pakistan and Maldives have a positive relationship between growth rate of exports 
and secondary market price of debt but other group of countries has the positive 
relationship. 
In addition to the price equation, the maximised value of external debt is also 
estimated, which indicates whether the country is on the right side of the Debt Laffer 
curve or on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve.  Estimates of the maximum 
market value of debt outstanding indicates that Pakistan is on the right side of the 
Debt Laffer curve because its current debt-to-export ratio in 1995 is 2.72 which is 
below the debt-to-export ratio for which its external debt reaches its maximum which 
is 3.44.  India is also on the correct side of Debt Laffer curve and its current debt-to-
export ratio is 3.63 and debt-to-export ratio for which its external debt reaches its 
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maximum is 5.12.  Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have debt to export ratios (in 
1995) are 5.38, 2.18, 5.59, respectively and their debt-to-export ratio for which their 
external debts reach their maximum are 6.96, 2.55, 6.42, respectively.  While in case 
of Maldives and Bhutan debt-to export ratios (in 1995) are 3.43 and 1.34, 
respectively which are above the debt-to-export ratio for which the external debt 
reaches their maximum which are 1.37 and 0.82, respectively, so they falls on the 
wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve. So Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and 
Nepal stand on the right side of the Debt Laffer curve because their current debt to 
export ratio (in 1995) is below the debt to export ratio for which their external debt 
reaches their maximum (see Appendix) .  The total debt stock of Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal has an increasing trend [World Debt Tables 
(1996)].  The external debt outstanding of Pakistan and India is bifurcated into 
private and public loans, in which private loans are hard loans and public loans are 
soft loans, while Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have taken only public loans so 
foreign debt has a favourable impact on their economies.  As for the case of 
Maldives and Bhutan, the both countries stand on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer 
curve because their current debt to export ratio, (in 1995) is far above to their debt to 
export ratio for which their external debt reaches their maximum level (see Appendix 
Table 1).  
In addition to the above, another approach is used to see whether a country 
uses a debt reduction scheme for or not for improving its economic position.  To 
analyse the effect of a debt write-off on the market value of external debt 
outstanding, the price elasticity of the debt is estimated. The price elasticity of the 
debt is estimated through Equation 5 (mentioned above).  The results of the equation 
are given in the Appendix.  
As mentioned in Equation (7), a country can gain from debt write off if the 
following condition is fulfilled.  
C  >  (1 – tx) (S.E) 
Where ‘C’ is price elasticity of external debt outstanding and tx is t-statistic of 
corresponding x degree of freedom and S.E is standard error of the estimate. Table 2 
provides price elasticities of external debt for South Asian countries.  The price 
elasticity of external debt for Pakistan is 0.39, which is less than (1 – tx) (S.E) so 
Pakistan does not gain from debt reduction.  India has a price elasticity of (–1.22) 
which is also less than desired value.  Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have the 
values  –0.66, –2.68 and –0.07 against the comparative values  (1– tx) (S.E), which 
are 1.51, 0.68 and 0.68, respectively. The values for Maldives and Bhutan are 0.14 
and 0.07, where product of S.E are greater which are –0.15 and 0.05, which means 
that they gain from debt reduction.  So it is concluded that Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal do not fulfil that above condition so we can say 
that debt reduction scheme for these countries will not benefit to them at this point.  
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But Maldives and Bhutan’s results show that this condition is fulfilled so they gain 
from debt write off.  As these results are rechecked again because from following the 
Claessens (1990) model, results show that debt reduction scheme is favourable for 
the both countries. 
 
Table 2 
Impact of Debt Reduction 
 (Estimation of Price Elasticity of External Debt) 
 Countries 
 PAK IND BANG S.LAN NEPAL MALDI BHUT 
Price Elasticities 0.39 –1.22 –0.61 –2.68 –0.07 0.14 0.07 
(1–tx)(S.E)  0.48 –0.35 1.51 0.68 0.68 –0.15 0.05 
*Based on Appendix Table 2. 
 
Figure 2 provides a picture of the estimates of the debt-to-export ratios at 
which the market value of debt reaches its maximum, EXT*, again the actual debt-
to-export ratio (of 1995), EXT, using the Equation (3), for South Asian countries.11 
The 45-degree line in Figure 2 divides the countries into two portions.  The right side 
of the Debt Laffer curve (above the 45-degree line) indicates that those are on the 
wrong side.  Sri Lanka and Nepal are on the correct side of Debt Laffer Curve. 
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Fig. 2.  EXT* versus EXT. 
 
Laffer curve, the side where the face value of debt is bellows the level for 
which the market value of external debt starts to decline.  The only country that is 
perceived by the market to be on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve are 
Maldives and Bhutan where the market value of debt is maximised at roughly the 
current debt level. This result implies that across-the-board debt forgiveness, through 
 
11The scales are in logs. 
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the general reduction of the nominal claims outstanding, is not in the interest of the 
creditors for most highly indebted countries. 
On the basis of above cited empirical evidences, it may be stated that 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have faced debt condition that may 
create serious problem for them.  However Maldives and Bhutan face the debt 
problem more severe than other South Asian countries.  The external debt of 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have been increasing one time but 
at relatively slower rate than the total debt of Maldives and Bhutan.  The debt 
situation of Maldives and Bhutan has deteriorated during the second half of the 
1980s [World Debt Tables (1996)], increases in interest rates and reduction in the 
maturity and grace periods in respect of new loan commitments added to their debt-
servicing problem, while for Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, 
terms and conditions of their new loan commitments maintained at favourable levels. 
In addition to the price equation, the maximised value of external debt is 
also estimated, which indicates whether the country is on the right side of the 
Debt Laffer curve or on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve.  Estimates of 
the maximum market value of debt outstanding indicates that Pakistan is on the 
right side of the Debt Laffer curve because its current debt-to-export ratio in 
1995 is 2.72 which is below the debt-to-export ratio for which its external debt 
reaches its maximum which is 3.44.  India is also on the correct side of Debt 
Laffer curve and its current debt-to-export ratio is 3.63 and debt-to-export ratio 
for which its external debt reaches its maximum is 5.12.  Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal have debt to export ratios (in 1995) are 5.38, 2.18, 5.59, respectively 
and their debt-to-export ratio for which their external debts reach their maximum 
are 6.96, 2.55, 6.42, respectively.  While in case of Maldives and Bhutan debt-to 
export ratios (in 1995) are 3.43 and 1.34, respectively which are above the debt-
to-export ratio for which the external debt reaches their maximum which are 1.37 
and 0.82, respectively, so they falls on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve. 
So Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal stand on the right side of 
the Debt Laffer curve because their current debt to export ratio (in 1995) is 
below the debt to export ratio for which their external debt reaches their 
maximum.  The total debt stock of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal has a increasing trend.  The external debt outstanding of Pakistan and 
India is bifurcated into private and public loans, in which private loans are hard 
loans and public loans are, relatively, soft loans.  Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Nepal have taken only public loans so foreign debt has a favourable impact on 
their economies.  As far as the case of Maldives and Bhutan is concerned, the 
both countries stand on the wrong side of the Debt Laffer curve because their 
current debt to export ratio, is far above to their debt to export ratio for which 
their external debt reaches at the maximum limit (see Appendix, Table 1).  
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The main focus of this paper was to highlight and analyse the problem of 
rising debt burden of South Asia.  The increasing dependency of South Asian 
economies on foreign resources is evident by their debt and debt servicing ratios of 
the South Asian countries, which is very high. The figures are alarming which 
indicated that the countries were on the verge of liquidity or solvency.  The ratios of 
debt to GNP and foreign exchange earnings both showed rising trends. 
To see whether debt reduction is favourable to the economies of South Asia, 
Debt Laffer curve is estimated.  The estimates of the Debt Laffer curve reveal that 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal lie on the right side of the Debt 
Laffer curve because their current level of debt outstanding is below that level of 
debt at which the market value of debt would be maximised.  But the difference 
between the current level of debt outstanding and that level of debt at which market 
value of debt would be maximised is not significant. Projection of these economies 
shows that if the same trend of borrowing continues, they may face a rising burden 
of debt and debt servicing.  On the other hand, Maldives and Bhutan lie on the wrong 
side of the Debt Laffer curve.  They can gain from debt write off. The rapid increase 
in the foreign debt of other South Asian countries also indicates that they will also 
reach at the maximum level of debt. Thus, there is a need for them also to better 
manage their debt. 
 
Appendix 1 
Appendix Table 1 
The Secondary Market Prices of External Debt Outstanding of South Asian Countries 
(Millions, Real)* 
Pakistan India Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal 
Year SMP MV EXT SMP MV EXT SMP MV EXT SMP MV EXT SMP MV EXT 
1970-71 0.180 2876.5 7.99 0.218 12966.04 3.92 0.125 1258.2 2.58 0.677 1833.49 1.33 0.181 5.15 0.07 
1971-72 0.628 10433 4.92 0.437 28880.35 4.34 0.142 258.2 1.54 1.436 4769.42 1.63 0.382 32.11 0.17 
1972-73 0.629 14712 2.73 0.189 14259.89 4.07 0.177 156.1 0.44 1.114 4278.64 1.91 0.105 12.39 0.20 
1973-74 0.448 20851 4.57 0.250 20561.47 3.65 0.493 1887.3 1.38 1.524 7377.62 1.84 0.009 1.79 0.30 
1974-75 0.343 16325 4.62 0.191 18601.13 3.07 0.427 4245.9 3.53 2.359 14314.47 1.73 0.021 6.10 0.41 
1975-76 0.573 32543 5.04 0.222 25468.54 3.14 0.103 1651.9 4.35 0.530 3549.17 1.69 0.026 9.11 0.32 
1976-77 0.845 53109 5.56 0.569 71053.30 2.51 0.138 4207.5 5.19 1.405 12955.8 1.91 0.025 14.80 0.48 
1977-78 0.454 32350 5.48 0.215 28561.46 2.38 0.107 4034.9 5.17 0.272 4122.20 2.31 0.018 23.23 1.25 
1978-79 0.126 9792. 4.56 0.122 16512.50 2.48 0.082 3667.2 5.45 0.158 3381.1 1.62 0.016 23.49 1.30 
1979-80 0.301 25811 3.66 0.491 70932.39 2.28 0.048 2300.2 4.66 0.643 15551.7 1.58 0.032 56.37 1.34 
1980-81 0.421 36546 2.96 1.563 253514.6 2.40 0.055 3432.3 5.33 0.568 17285.0 1.73 0.013 33.64 2.55 
1981-82 0.454 42190 3.53 1.450 292032.9 2.81 0.094 6842.1 5.15 1.843 79287.9 2.04 0.042 139.3 1.93 
1982-83 3.866 457494 3.44 1.933 509702.0 2.98 0.036 3642.0 5.94 4.468 244097. 2.55 0.025 114.2 3.93 
1983-84 0.791 101068 3.42 1.093 359664.9 3.56 0.039 5013.2 7.29 0.116 7905.3 2.70 0.016 99.98 4.59 
1984-85 0.752 111018 3.88 1.091 439096.9 3.75 0.027 3753.8 5.92 0.951 72352.6 2.04 0.007 55.15 3.40 
1985-86 1.056 189389 3.62 1.251 625723.7 4.42 0.023 3859.0 6.07 0.168 16156.3 2.65 0.031 324.7 3.60 
1986-87 1.140 235585 3.26 0.722 446271.3 5.22 0.018 4213.5 8.79 0.469 53376.6 3.34 0.049 708.3 4.77 
1987-88 0.444 101102 2.9 0.420 303240.3 4.94 0.012 3500.9 9.01 0.148 20645.0 3.39 0.212 4473 6.42 
1988-89 0.542 147784 3.02 0.676 571965.0 4.60 0.020 6349.2 7.8 0.044 7181.87 3.52 0.009 225.8 5.79 
1989-90 0.357 115868 3.40 0.334 408171.2 4.75 0.009 3109.1 8.17 0.201 37479.9 3.32 0.008 290.0 8.05 
1990-91 0.399 138469 2.51 0.202 297420.0 4.68 0.042 17041. 6.96 0.020 4721.45 3.06 0.006 287.9 7.59 
1991-92 0.398 171835 2.51 0.392 807755.5 5.13 0.007 3651.9 7.44 0.005 1359.20 3.29 0.006 329.8 5.62 
1992-93 0.121 60066 2.79 0.181 431805.7 4.68 0.010 5074.4 6.17 0.025 7201.01 2.61 0.004 296.6 4.78 
1993-94 0.067 41406 2.98 0.151 433581.8 4.38 0.001 5343.8 6.08 0.018 5775.17 2.37 0.004 392.6 4.81 
1994-95 0.126 86451 2.72 0.124 352769.5 3.63 0.013 7572.6 5.38 0.016 5507.70 2.18 0.002 270.3 5.59 
*In country’s respective currency.                                              
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Appendix Table 2 
The Secondary Market Prices of External Debt Outstanding (SAARC) 
Maldives Bhutan 
  Year SMP MV EXT SMP MV EXT 
1976-77 0.027 0.023 0.02 – – – 
1977-78 0.007 0.420 1.34 – – – 
1978-79 0.054 4.326 1.24 – – – 
1979-80 0.007 0.638 1.20 – – – 
1980-81 0.102 22.416 2.02 0.028 0.067 0.01 
1981-82 0.068 19.984 2.46 0.043 0.112 0.02 
1982-83 0.409 190.954 3.76 0.037 0.395 0.06 
1983-84 0.359 195.228 3.90 0.034 0.630 0.09 
1984-85 5.360 3129.123 3.58 0.030 0.931 0.11 
1985-86 0.909 536.078 3.26 0.026 2.858 0.25 
1986-87 0.666 327.451 2.55 0.024 6.419 0.37 
1987-88 0.016 10.908 2.09 0.014 7.440 0.50 
1988-89 1.154 722.962 1.60 1.117 1043.309 0.82 
1989-90 0.104 62.705 1.30 0.011 13.166 0.92 
1990-91 .007 5.392 1.34 0.014 19.165 0.90 
1991-92 5.179 4312.226 1.37 0.007 14.492 1.13 
1992-93 0.013 13.138 1.90 0.035 75.887 1.20 
1993-94 0.078 97.866 2.98 0.004 10.026 1.37 
1994-95 0.115 166.176 3.43 0.007 19.223 1.34 
Where:  SMP = secondary market price of the debt.  MV = Maximised value of external debt outstanding. 
              EXT = External debt outstanding to export ratio.                     
 
Appendix Table 3 
Estimates of the Price Equation of External Debt Outstanding 
Dependent Countries 
Variable PAK IND BANG S.LAN NEPAL MALDI BHUT  
CONST. –1.24 0.36 –1.29 3.07 –3.56 –2.51 –3.93 
 (–1.43) (0.42) (–2.37)* (1.71)** (–14.4)* (–4.43)* (–7.23)* 
LEXT 0.26 –0.85 –1.20 –5.66 –0.52 0.0.58 –0.19 
 (0.40) (–1.22) (–3.89) (–2.78)* (–3.28)* (1.34) (–0.79) 
GREXP 0.004 –0.016 –0.004 –0.03 –0.05 0.09 –0.003 
 (0.75) (–0.83) (0.62) (–0.93) (–0.57) (0.35) (–0.01) 
R2 0.02 0.15 0.44 0.26 0.33 0.11 0.05 
D.W 0.89 0.79 0.82 1.50 1.09 2.41 2.28 
Figures in parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
*Significant at 5 percent. ** Significant at 10 percent. 
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Comments 
 
The paper entitled, “Debt Laffer Curve for South Asian Countries”, by M. 
Aslam Chaudhary and Sabahat Anwar deals with an important issue affecting the 
economy of South Asian countries. Utilising the data for the period 1976-77–1994-
95, the study concludes the following: 
 (1) The debt servicing ratios are alarmingly high in the South Asian Countries. 
 (2) The estimates of laffer curve show that Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka and Nepal lie on the right side of the debt laffer curve whereas 
Bhutan and Maldives are on the wrong side of the laffer curve. Thus, 
Bhutan and Maldives can benefit from the debt reduction. 
 (3) The rapid rise in debt indicates the need for better management of debt in 
South Asian countries. 
The first and the third points are not surprising conclusions. The second point 
is expected to be sensitive to the selection of period of study. Extending the time 
period to the year 2000 may change the conclusions significantly as the data shows 
deterioration in the debt situation of Pakistan. Extending the analysis to the year 
2002 will also change the analysis significantly. The analysis will be more 
meaningful if critical debt ratios are analysed by sub periods.  
The results of the price equation, reported in Table 1, indicate that the effect 
of debt-export ratio and growth rate of exports on secondary market price of external 
debt in South Asia are not statistically significant, except for Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. This raises the questions about the usefulness of reported results and 
specification of the model. Dummy variables, for the different time periods, and 
other variables like debt-GDP ratio, growth rate of gross domestic product can also 
be incorporated in price equation. This will give us more meaningful results. For 
example, the coefficient estimates of dummy variables will be useful in analysing the 
structural changes in price behaviour. 
The study seems to suggest that only the countries lying on the wrong side of 
the debt laffer curve will benefit from debt reduction. This is a surprising conclusion 
because reduction in debt will be beneficial to all the countries, irrespective of their 
position on the debt laffer curve.  
The main contribution of the authors is computation of EAI, i.e., equal annual 
installments of debt servicing on a given external debt outstanding. It will be useful 
to those working on this important topic if the authors add this series in the data 
appendix along with the critical ratios of debt to export, debt to GDP and export 
growth.  
 
Rehana Siddiqui 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,  
Islamabad. 
